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Globalization has drastically improved access of technological latecomers to advanced
technologies and provides a unique opportunity for low-income countries to raise per
capita income. This paper shows that low-income countries as a group have in fact
substantially increased the GDP-ratio of technology imports over the past few years, but
that there are large cross-country discrepancies in technology upgrading within this
group. General-purpose technology continues to constitute the bulk of technology
imports, while sector-specific technology used for labour-intensive activities has gained
in importance. Improved access to technology imports appears not to have improved
labour productivity and the demand for skilled labour in many low-income countries.
To raise the benefits reaped from globalization, governments might need to make
additional efforts towards a simultaneous increase in technology imports and the skill
level of the domestic labour force.
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Introduction
Both standard neoclassical growth theory and recent endogenous growth theory explain
persistent poverty in developing countries as being partly due to differences in
technology between rich and poor countries. Neoclassical theory considers technology
as both universally available and applicable, and technological differences as gaps in the
endowments of objects, such as factories or roads. By contrast, endogenous growth
theory considers that gaps in the endowment of ideas and in the limited capability of
developing countries to absorb new knowledge are the main reasons for poverty. The
latter implies that development policy should concentrate on the interaction between
technology and skills with a view to facilitating the reduction of the idea gap.
One of the main opportunities which globalization—the integration of national
economies—is said to offer to developing countries is that they would have better
access to the technical advances in developed countries. Integration would help to
reduce the technology gap and to raise the level of total factor productivity and per
capita income in developing countries. Coe and Helpman (1995), Keller (1998) and
Coe, Helpman and Hoffmaister (1997)—henceforth CHH (1997)—have shown
empirically that countries which have imported more from the world’s technology
leaders have experienced faster growth in total factor productivity. This paper refines
the measure which these authors used to proxy technology imports and assesses whether
on this refined measure technology transfer to low-income countries has increased over
the past few years.
The role of technology adoption in the process of economic development has been a
recurrent theme in the economic literature. It highlights that the cross-country
distribution of per capita income will move up over time with no change in its range if
the distribution of technology adoption is constant over time, i.e. all countries adopt new
technology equally. To reduce this range, backward countries will need to upgrade their
level of technology faster than the advanced countries. The realization of technological
improvements in backward countries is closely interrelated with their educational
attainment: their skill supply influences the amount and degree of sophistication of
technology which can be adopted and efficiently used, while in turn the amount and
sophistication of newly introduced technology impacts on the demand for skills. This
means that globalization can ignite an virtuous circle of technological upgrading and
skill accumulation in technological latecomers.
It is clear that the interdependence between globalization, technology upgrading and
skill accumulation is determined by many factors and a full specification of these
mechanisms is beyond the scope of this paper. The more modest objective of the paper
is to concentrate on trade flows as a vehicle for technology transfer to developing
countries and to assess empirically two phenomena which reflect whether or not
globalization has ignited a virtuous circle between technology upgrading and skill
accumulation: (1) the evolution of machinery and equipment imports and their sectoral
bias, and (2) the change in the demand for skilled labour.
Section 1 presents a simple framework regarding the interaction between technology
upgrading and skill accumulation. Section 2 assesses technology imports by low-income
countries from both developed countries and developing countries with significant2
domestic research and development (R&D) spending, where the latter group will be
called ‘technologically more advanced developing countries’. Section 3 discusses
changes in labour productivity and the demand for skilled labour, and section 4 provides
some concluding remarks. Throughout the paper, specific emphasis will be placed on
low-income countries where—following UNCTAD (2000)—this group includes all
developing countries with a per capita GDP of under US$ 800 in 1995.
1 Technology and skill accumulation
The shortage of modern technology is widely assumed to hold down the level of per
capita income in low-income countries. But there is little empirical evidence on whether
the improved access to modern technology which has come about with globalization has
helped alleviate this shortage. It is clear that their improved access to modern
technology alone does not guarantee that low-income countries will realize productivity
increases. They need the human capital required to absorb and efficiently use modern
technology. Moreover, economic policies and institutional arrangements impact on the
actual amount of modern technology which low-income countries can import.
The combined role of education and technology for output generation can be expressed
in two alternative ways in the production function. First, they can be viewed as
multiplicative inputs which implies that the ‘marginal productivity’ of education—
determined by the number of inputs and the current technology—can remain positive
even if the technology does not change. A second, and probably more useful, view
(Nelson and Phelps, 1966; Lucas, 1993; Young, 1993) argues that education has a
positive payoff only if the technology is always improving.
This second view can be formalized building on a model by Nelson and Phelps (1966).
The model shows that the rate at which technological latecomers realize technology
improvements made in technologically advanced countries is a positive function of their
educational attainment (with ￿￿ / ￿h > 0) and proportional to the gap between the
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Accordingly, the potential level of technology which is employed in a technologically
backward country depends on its own educational attainment h and the rate of3
technological progress in the advanced countries which becomes available to the
backward countries. Assuming that production is characterised by a low elasticity of
substitution between imported technology and domestic skilled labour, there are rapidly
decreasing returns to the increase of either (imported technology or domestic skilled
labour) in the absence of rising supply of the other.
The introduction of new technology can stimulate skill accumulation in two ways. First,
the technology can be of a more recent vintage without affecting the sectoral
composition of production (within-industry effects). Second, assuming the existence of
a technology ladder in the production of goods ordered by increasing technical
sophistication, the introduction of new technology can stimulate skill accumulation
also—and perhaps most importantly—when it leads to a change in the sectoral
composition of production by relating to activities which are one rung up on the
technology ladder compared to those which already exist in an economy (between-
industry effects). Hence, the full impact of technology adoption on skill accumulation
depends on the amount of new technology that is introduced and on the degree of
change in the structure of production up the technology ladder which the new
technology entails.
The introduction of new technology is constrained by barriers to technology adoption.
When such constraints are present, the technology inflows which can be realized (*F)




















Several factors determine the difference between * and *F. Import rules and restrictions
will limit technology imports—one effect of trade integration is the decline of such
limits. Natural trade barriers such as geographical distance can reduce technology
imports to the extent that geographical distance raises transportation costs of capital
equipment which embodies technology to prohibitive levels. From a micro-economic
perspective, high costs of firms to invest in new technology limit its adoption (see
Parente and Prescott, 1994, for a detailed discussion) including a cumbersome legal and
regulatory framework or high real interest rates and an unstable exchange rate which do
not enable potential investors to make long-term plans.
From a macroeconomic perspective, a country’s ability to import new technology will
be seriously limited if it is subject to a balance-of-payments constraint because it cannot
achieve export earnings that fetch the foreign exchange which is required to pay for
such imports. The level of the export-earnings requirement is determined by the share of
machinery investment which needs to be imported, as well as by the level of aggregate
investment and the proportion of investment which is machinery (as distinguished from
construction).
But increased trade integration also has a composition effect on the country’s
production structure. As argued above, this composition effect impacts on the direction
of change up or down the technology ladder brought about by the sectoral bias of the
new technology. On the import side, an inflow of new technology that raises
productivity of all sectors equally will not alter comparative advantage in the framework4
of standard trade theory. But the opposite will be the case if the inflow of technology is
sectorally biased, since for Ricardian reasons this will alter comparative advantage.1
On the export side, the composition effect works through two channels that can pull in
different directions. The first channel regards the terms of trade: to maximize its export
earnings, the country should strive to export those products which are not subject to
declining terms of trade. The second channel regards the country’s comparative
advantage: to maximize its export earnings, the country will need to change its
production and export structure towards those sectors in which it has a competitive
edge. Concern has often been expressed in this regard because to the extent that
manufacturing is higher up on the technology ladder and provides a better growth
potential than agriculture, developing countries might experience de-industrialization
and lower growth because their comparative advantage is usually not in manufacturing.
Globalization further complicates the composition effect of trade integration. With an
increasing number of countries integrating into the world economy, a specific country’s
comparative advantage changes over time depending on the evolution of effective
global factor endowments in addition to changes in the country’s own factor
combination. The effective global factor endowment changes according to the
additional factor supply from newly integrating countries. It has been argued by Wood
(1997), for example, that China’s increased trade integration in the early 1980s has
significantly increased the effective world supply of labour with basic skills and that
this has significantly lowered the comparative advantage which integrating Latin
American countries would have had in low-skilled-labour-intensive activities in the
absence of China’s integration.
This suggests that the interrelationship between technology imports, the sectoral
composition of production and skill accumulation depends on many factors, and a full
specification of these mechanisms is beyond the scope of this paper. Nonetheless, the
above implies that two measurable magnitudes play a role in whether or not
globalization can ignite a virtuous circle of technology upgrading and skill
accumulation in low income countries: (1) the inflow of modern technology, and (2) the
sectoral bias of technology inflows. The following section focuses on an assessment of
these magnitudes.
2 Trade integration and technology imports: some statistical evidence
One measure of global integration is the extent to which a country has absorbed the
global stock of technology and other knowledge. However, such a measure is difficult
to calculate. This section examines indirect measures of (technological) integration by
looking at the GDP-ratios of trade, total imports and, most importantly, machinery
imports.2 The group of 46 low-income countries analysed in this paper includes all
1 Comparative advantage will change also when technological progress has a factor bias.
2 Data on international patenting has been suggested by, for example, Eaton and Kortum (1999) as an
alternative road to identify international technology diffusion. However, given the lack of
comprehensive data for developing countries in this regard, such studies have typically been confined
to technology diffusion among the most developed countries.5
developing countries with a per capita income of under US$ 800 in 1995 for which data
are available (see appendix for the list of countries).
The analysis of technology imports builds on CHH (1997) who provide evidence which
suggests that there is significant technology transfer from the developed to developing
countries. They measure the stock of foreign technology which a developing country
can access as a weighted average of the domestic R&D capital stocks of its developed-
country trading partners, with bilateral machinery and equipment import shares of each
developing country with respect to the developed country serving as weights.
The statistical analysis3 in this paper diverges from that in CHH (1997) in three main
respects.4 First, the technology imports of low-income countries are not weighted
according to the domestic R&D capital stock of the country’s trading partners. Coe and
Hoffmaister (1999) in fact note that using simple import averages instead of bilateral
import weights leads to essentially similar results. This suggests that whereas a
country’s level of total factor productivity is affected by its trading partners’ level of
technological development, the intensity of this relationship is not crucial because of the
public good nature of knowledge. In other words, it matters for a developing country
how much technology it imports from the developed countries, but it is unimportant
whether it imports 50 per cent from the United States and 30 per cent from Japan or the
other way round. Hence, this paper analyses imports from the technology leaders
combined.
Second, due to data problems in the calculation of the foreign R&D capital stock, CHH
(1997) do not take into account technology imports from other developing countries.
However, such imports are likely to be important especially for the technologically least
advanced economies because technology imports from technologically more advanced
developing countries can be considered less sophisticated than those from developed
countries as they are likely to be of an older vintage or a lower technological level.
Accordingly, technologically least developed countries absorb technology imported
from technologically more advanced developing countries more easily than technology
imported from developed countries. Hence, technology imports from those developing
countries with—according to CHH (1997)—significant domestic R&D expenditure (see
Appendix), will be examined in addition to imports from developed countries.
Third, CHH (1997) follow conventional practice in the analysis of technology imports
and limit their analysis to aggregate data on machinery and transport equipment (i.e.,
section 7 of SITC Rev.2). By contrast, a finer data breakdown appears to be suited
better to the purposes of this paper for three reasons: first, parts of such imports – most
importantly transport equipment, television sets etc, household-type equipment, and
transistors and semi-conductor devices – are better classified as consumption or imports
for re-export, rather than capital equipment. Second, specialized capital equipment will
be singled out to see whether technology transfer has been of a general-purpose nature
3 The analysis is based on mirror trade data, i.e., exports from country A to country B are used to
measure imports by country B from country A. The reason for this that the availability and reliability
of import data of many low-income countries is very poor.
4 The results reported by CHH (1997, pp. 138–9) were reproduced for consistency reasons. Only very
small discrepancies were detected except for Zambia where the discrepancy is over three percentage
points. These discrepancies are most likely due to the use of different sources for GDP-data.6
or whether it has been sectorally biased.5 Whereas general-purpose technology imports
can be considered as raising productivity in all sectors equally, sectorally-biased
technology imports affect the importing country’s comparative advantage. As a result, a
change in the structure of production (and exports) is likely to be associated with
sectorally-biased technology imports. Third, a finer breakdown of technology imports
allows to assess whether technology transfer in any given sector to low-income
countries has been faster from the developed or from the technologically more advanced
developing countries.
Figure 1 shows that the weighted GDP-ratio of machinery imports for the group of 46
low-income countries has been higher6 over the last few years than during the 1970s
and 1980s, despite the sharp drop after 1995 to its level during the second half of the
1980s.7 The figure also shows that technology imports from technologically more
advanced developing countries have considerably gained in importance and that they
represent between one fifth and one fourth of all technology imports by low-income
countries.
Figure 1



















Machinery imports from technologically more advanced developing countries
Machinery imports from developed countries
Source: Trade data from COMTRADE, GDP-data from UNCTAD database.
Note: See appendix for the composition of country and product groups.
5 In this paper, the term ‘general-purpose technology’ relates to technology which can be used in
various industrial sectors. It therefore differs from the meaning in, for example, Bresnahan and
Trajtenberg (1995) where general-purpose technologies are characterized by an inherent potential for
technical improvements and innovative complementarities in addition to pervasiveness.
6 A rise in the GDP-ratio of imports can be caused by purely accounting reasons because of real
currency depreciation. However, table 1 below shows that machinery imports have grown faster than
total imports so that the increase shown in figure 1 is not just a statistical artifact.
7 This drop reflects a general slowdown of world trade caused initially by a sharp deceleration of import
growth in developed economies and then by the turmoil following the outbreak of the East Asian
crisis.7
Figure 2 shows the weighted GDP-ratios of selected sectoral machinery imports.8
Textile and leather machinery combined with metalworking machinery account for the
bulk of specialized machinery imports and—with a very steep increase at the beginning
of the 1990s and a sharp drop after 1995—both of these categories closely mirror the
evolution of total machinery imports. Even though the absolute importance of these
imports from technologically more advanced developing countries remains small, their
proportional change during the first half of the 1990s is impressive: the GDP-ratio of
metalworking machinery doubled and that of textile and leather machinery even rose
fivefold between the mid-1980s and the mid-1990s.
Figure 2















































































Textile and leather machinery from advanced developing countries
Textile and leather machinery from developed countries
Metalworking machinery from advanced developing countries
Metalworking machinery from developed countries
Construction, mining and metal crushing machinery from advanced developing countries
Construction, mining and metal crushing machinery from developed countries
Source: Trade data from COMTRADE, GDP-data from UNCTAD database.
Note: See appendix for the composition of country and product groups.
Figure 3 assesses the sectoral bias of technology imports by plotting the ratio of
sectorally-specific to general-purpose technology imports. The sectorally-specific
technology imports have been classified according to the primary factors which are
intensively employed in their use: agricultural land (agricultural machinery and
tractors), mineral and fuel resources (metalworking machinery; and construction,
mining and metal crushing machinery), low-skilled labour (textile and leather
machinery), agricultural land and skilled labour (food-processing machinery and paper
8 The ratios of agricultural machinery and tractors, paper and pulp mill machinery, printing and
bookbinding machinery, and food-processing machinery imports are not shown because they are very
small.8
and pulp-mill machinery), and scale and skilled labour (printing and bookbinding
machinery).9
Figure 3












































































































agriculture mineral low-skilled labour
scale and skilled labour resource and skilled labour
Source: COMTRADE.
The figure shows that specialized-technology imports have always been small compared
to imports of general-purpose technology, and that this fraction has become even
smaller over the past few years: while the combined GDP-ratio of specialized-
technology imports from both developed and technologically more advanced
developing countries was about half that of general-purpose technology imports, it fell
to about one third during the 1990s. This drop in the combined ratio is due to the drop in
technology imports related to activities in the primary sector—both agricultural and, in
particular, mineral and fuel-based. Even though the comparatively low ratio of
agriculture-related technology is not surprising because of the well-known difficulties
associated with the applicability of agricultural technology across different climatic and
soil conditions, its substantial drop is noteworthy.
Whereas the ratio of skill-related technology imports has by and large remained
constant, that of labour-related technology imports strongly increased during the second
half of the 1980s and the early 1990s, reaching the same level as that of mineral-related
technology, before falling in a similar way as technology imports related to the minerals
sector. This means that, for the group of low-income countries as a whole, the sectoral
9 The classification is partly based on OECD (1992, p. 152). As any such classification, it includes
some arbitrariness.9
bias of technology imports is small and that this bias has shifted from primary-sector-
related to low-skilled-labour-intensive technology.
In addition to their GDP-ratios, the evolution of technology imports can also be assessed
by their rate of growth compared to that of total imports. Table 1 shows that the average
growth rate of the absolute value of machinery imports by low-income countries from
both developed and technologically more advanced developing countries has exceeded
that of total imports for all sub-periods since 1970. The growth rate of imports from
both developed and advanced developing countries regarding textile and leather
machinery, as well as regarding technology-including consumption goods, has dropped
sharply during the 1990s, while the growth rate of transistor and semi-conductor
imports has risen strongly. It is also noteworthy that all categories of technology imports
from technologically more advanced developing countries have grown faster than total
imports in all of the sub-periods, except the 1990s where the growth of several
categories are lower than that of total imports.
Turning to country-specific evidence, Table 2 suggests that the GDP-ratio of machinery
imports has increased in relatively few low-income countries between the 1970s and the
1990s. The unweighted cross-country median has risen only marginally, and the GDP-
ratios of machinery imports from developed countries have increased by more than
1 percentage point in only 12 of the 46 countries, while they have fallen by more than
half a percentage point in 8 countries. However, apart from a number of very small
countries, large countries such as China, India and Nigeria are among those whose
machinery-import ratios have risen most. This explains the more positive evidence
discussed above on the basis of weighted averages (Figure 1). It is also noteworthy that
there is no country for which the ratio between machinery imports from technologically
more advanced developing countries and from developed countries has fallen; this
confirms the evidence presented above regarding the increasingly important role of
machinery imports from technologically more advanced developing countries.
To understand the reasons for the cross-country discrepancies in the ratio of machinery
imports to GDP, it may be helpful to look for correlations across low-income countries
between the change in the GDP-ratio of technology imports between the 1970s and the
1990s and variables which come readily to mind as influencing technology imports: low
investment, factor combinations and geographical location which are not conducive to
industrial development, high tariffs and other impediments to machinery and equipment
imports, and a lack of foreign exchange to pay for such imports. From a methodological
point of view, a pairwise correlation analysis is preferable to an analysis which
combines the variables in multiple regressions because of the endogeneity between
technology imports and, for example, educational attainment or investment.
For this purpose, the set of 46 countries was modified by omitting the two countries for
which comprehensive data for the 1970s are not available (Angola and Mozambique),
as well as the four countries with a population below one million inhabitants (Comoros,
Equatorial Guinea, Guyana, and Sao Tome and Principe) whose very high technology
imports ratios are statistical outliers. The first column of Table 3 reports the coefficients
of correlation (R) across the 40 remaining countries between 14 variables and the
absolute discrepancy between the GDP-ratio of machinery imports during 1990–1998
and that during 1970–1979 (or, as indicated for three variables, the absolute level of the
GDP-ratio of machinery imports during 1990–1998). A glance down the column reveals
that the sign of only one of the correlations (with external debt) is contrary to10
expectations, indicated by square brackets around the number, and that the correlation
with only two other variables (distance to the closest major port, and change in total
import charges between the 1980s and 1990s) are weak.
Table 1
Imports by low-income countries, selected categories
1970–1998, average growth rates.
(percentages)
1970–79 1980–89 1990–98
Total imports from world 20.1 3.6 10.4
Imports from developed countries, by category
Total 21.5 3.0 8.1
Machinery and transport equipment (SITC7) 11.1 1.2 9.5
of which
Transport equipment 10.7 -3.6 4.6
Technology-including consumption goods 11.1 5.0 0.4
Transistors and semiconductor devices 11.9 28.0 27.2
Machinery 11.4 3.0 11.2
of which:
Agricultural machinery 10.3 -6.9 0.1
Textile and leather machinery 8.8 10.0 1.2
Paper and pulp mill machinery 14.6 -1.9 22.1
Printing and bookbinding machinery 6.0 2.6 15.4
Food-processing machinery 16.8 1.1 9.0
Construction, mining and metal-crushing machinery 14.2 -5.3 6.5
Metalworking machinery 6.4 6.7 11.6
Imports from technologically more advanced developing countries, by category
Total 30.3 11.1 13.6
Machinery and transport equipment (SITC7) 25.8 11.6 14.0
of which
Transport equipment 25.9 -0.8 9.4
Technology-including consumption goods 37.9 5.3 9.1
Transistors and semiconductor devices 73.3 42.2 26.2
Machinery 23.1 18.5 14.4
of which:
Agricultural machinery 24.9 3.0 15.0
Textile and leather machinery 18.9 17.5 9.0
Paper and pulp mill machinery 26.9 11.9 15.4
Printing and bookbinding machinery 15.3 22.3 9.9
Food-processing machinery 32.3 2.4 9.2
Construction, mining and metal-crushing machinery 55.3 -1.0 19.5
Metalworking machinery 24.2 12.8 20.4
Source: Total imports from world from UNCTAD database; all other data from COMTRADE.11
Table 2:
Share of machinery imports in GDP (percentages)
Developed Advanced Developed Advanced Developed Advanced
countries developing countries developing countries developing
economies ratio economies ratio economies ratio
(1) (2) (2)/(1) (3) (4) (4)/(3) (5) (6) (6)/(5)
Afghanistan 0.9 0.1 0.1 1.1 0.1 0.1 0.7 0.4 0.6
Angola n.a n.a n.a 3.6 0.3 0.1 5.3 0.5 0.1
Bangladesh 0.7 0.1 0.2 1.1 0.4 0.4 0.9 0.8 0.9
Benin 2.5 0.1 0.0 3.2 0.1 0.0 2.4 0.7 0.3
Burkina Faso 2.3 0.0 0.0 2.5 0.0 0.0 2.9 0.1 0.0
Burundi 1.3 0.0 0.0 2.3 0.0 0.0 2.2 0.1 0.1
Cameroon 3.2 0.0 0.0 2.9 0.0 0.0 2.0 0.1 0.0
CAR 2.3 0.0 0.0 1.9 0.1 0.0 1.8 0.1 0.0
Chad 1.5 0.0 0.0 1.3 0.0 0.0 1.7 0.0 0.0
China 0.4 0.0 0.0 1.7 0.2 0.1 2.8 0.7 0.2
Comoros 4.9 0.0 0.0 8.5 0.2 0.0 11.4 0.2 0.0
Congo (Dem. R 2.3 0.0 0.0 2.4 0.1 0.0 1.5 0.1 0.0
Cote d'Ivoire 4.8 0.1 0.0 2.8 0.1 0.0 2.9 0.2 0.1
Eq. Guinea 3.9 0.0 0.0 9.1 0.2 0.0 9.7 0.3 0.0
Ethiopia 1.8 0.1 0.1 2.5 0.1 0.1 3.3 0.3 0.1
Gambia 4.4 0.1 0.0 5.6 0.5 0.1 4.8 0.7 0.1
Ghana 3.6 0.1 0.0 2.8 0.2 0.1 5.5 0.5 0.1
Guinea 1.9 0.0 0.0 3.4 0.1 0.0 2.8 0.2 0.1
Guinea-Bissau 4.5 0.0 0.0 8.7 0.3 0.0 5.0 0.3 0.1
Guyana 9.6 0.1 0.0 9.5 0.5 0.0 14.9 1.5 0.1
Haiti 4.3 0.0 0.0 4.8 0.1 0.0 1.7 0.1 0.1
Honduras 4.5 0.3 0.1 3.3 0.3 0.1 6.2 0.7 0.1
India 0.7 0.0 0.0 1.2 0.1 0.1 1.5 0.2 0.2
Kenya 4.5 0.2 0.0 4.0 0.3 0.1 4.5 0.6 0.1
Madagascar 2.2 0.0 0.0 2.5 0.0 0.0 2.7 0.2 0.1
Malawi 2.9 0.0 0.0 2.7 0.1 0.0 2.5 0.2 0.1
Mali 2.6 0.0 0.0 2.9 0.1 0.0 3.3 0.2 0.1
Mauritania 6.0 0.2 0.0 7.1 0.2 0.0 6.9 0.3 0.0
Mozambique n.a n.a n.a 3.3 0.4 0.1 4.0 0.3 0.1
Nepal 0.5 0.3 0.6 1.3 0.5 0.4 1.3 1.2 0.9
Nicaragua 3.8 0.1 0.0 2.6 0.5 0.2 5.3 0.6 0.1
Niger 2.3 0.0 0.0 2.7 0.0 0.0 1.9 0.1 0.1
Nigeria 2.7 0.1 0.0 2.9 0.2 0.1 4.7 0.6 0.1
Pakistan 2.6 0.0 0.0 2.8 0.3 0.1 2.9 0.8 0.3
Rwanda 1.3 0.0 0.0 1.6 0.0 0.0 1.4 0.1 0.0
Sao Tome 3.0 0.0 0.0 7.0 0.1 0.0 16.2 0.6 0.0
Senegal 3.9 0.0 0.0 4.2 0.1 0.0 4.0 0.1 0.0
Sierra Leone 3.0 0.0 0.0 2.6 0.1 0.0 3.8 0.3 0.1
Somalia 4.7 0.0 0.0 6.4 0.1 0.0 1.7 0.2 0.1
Sri Lanka 1.8 0.3 0.2 3.6 0.9 0.2 3.0 1.5 0.5
Sudan 2.5 0.1 0.0 1.8 0.1 0.1 1.7 0.5 0.3
Tanzania 3.8 0.2 0.1 3.5 0.2 0.1 3.7 0.5 0.1
Togo 6.1 0.0 0.0 4.5 0.1 0.0 3.5 0.5 0.1
Uganda 0.8 0.0 0.1 0.9 0.1 0.1 1.8 0.2 0.1
Zambia 5.0 0.2 0.0 5.3 0.2 0.0 4.1 0.2 0.0
Zimbabwe 0.1 0.0 0.0 2.1 0.0 0.0 3.8 0.2 0.1
MEDIAN 2.7 0.0 0.0 2.9 0.1 0.0 3.0 0.3 0.1
1970–79 1980–89 1990-98
Imports from Imports from Imports from
Source: COMTRADE except for GDP data which are from UNCTAD database.
Notes: For the composition of the country groupings, see appendix.12
Table 3:
Factors associated with variation among low-income countries in technology imports
Correlation (R)
ih
proportional drop in absolute no P-value of P-value of
absolute
di
difference level by more significant t-test of t-test of





of means of means
(number of countries, if < and during 1970– ('good ('poor ('average (good vs poor (good vs
performers') performers') performers') performers) performers)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
A. Investment and
Gross domestic investment (% of GDP), 1990–97
(37)
0.58 23.2 11.8 15.9 0.15 0.01
Change in gross dom. investment, 1990s - 1970s
(32)
0.68 5.6 –9.8 –1.6 0.06 0.02
Risk index 1995 (ICRG): high = good
(32)
0.50 61.5 41.3 53.3 0.16 0.02
Inflows of FDI (% of GDP), 1990–
98
0.46
a 1.5 0.2 0.9 0.03 [0.31]
B. Factor endowment and
Square km of land per 100 workers, 1995
(30)
–0.25 2.0 1.6 9.1 [0.76] 0.00
Years of schooling, 1995
(30)
0.43 4.3 3.0 2.6 0.04 0.01
Population, 1995
('000)
0.29 244466 6900 18011 0.12 0.14
Mineral reserves, 1990: $mn/100 sq
k
0.33 23.9 0.2 2.3 0.05 0.07
Distance to closest major port: km
(39)
–0.05 5246 4773 5625 [0.75] [0.54]
C. Charges on imports of machinery and
T o t a li m p o r tc h a r g e s ,m o s tr e c e n ty e a r
(17)
–0.44
a 18.1 n.a. 15.2 n.a. [0.59]
Change in total import charges, 1990s - 1980s
(11)
–0.02 –35.7 n.a. –12.0 n.a. [0.29]
D. Balance-of-payments
External debt, 1990–97: % of
G
[0.38]
a 64.4 130.5 143 0.43 0.00
Change in capacity to import, 1990s - 1970s
(34)
0.36 3.7 1.3 1.4 0.08 0.09
Change in level of exports, 1990s -1970s,
(34)
0.36 3.8 1.5 1.7 0.07 0.09
Means of explanatory variables for countries
ih
Sources: see Mayer (2000)
Notes: Square brackets around an R-value or P-value indicate that the direction of relationship is
contary to expectations. 'Good performers' group contains 10 countries,'poor performers' group
contains 3 countries and 'average performers' group contains 27 countries. The superscript a
indicates that the R-value refers to the relationship.between the variable and the level of
machinery imports during the 1990s.
The first four rows of the column (Panel A) shows positive relationships between the
size of the change in GDP-ratios of machinery imports and measures of investment and
investment climate: the average share of gross domestic investment in GDP in the
1990s, its absolute increase between the 1970s and the 1990s, the December-1995 value
of the index of the international country risk guide (ICRG) which reflects the risk
perception of international investors, and the average GDP-ratio of inflows of foreign
direct investment in the 1990s. The link between domestic investment and the
investment climate on the one side and machinery imports on the other is
straightforward as imported capital equipment is put to productive use through
investment. It is widely accepted that inward foreign direct investment should play a
substantial role in the international diffusion of technology. However, the extent to
which inward FDI is associated with technology diffusion in the form of machinery
imports very much depends on the kind of FDI: it is likely to lead to machinery imports
in the same year as the investment is undertaken in the case of greenfield investment,
while anecdotal evidence suggests that FDI in the form of mergers and acquisitions is
associated with machinery imports only after a lag of several years, or sometimes not at
all. Unsurprisingly, the correlation coefficients in panel A are the highest of all, even13
though the correlation between inward FDI and machinery imports is comparatively
weak.
The selection of endowment-related and geographical variables in Panel B is based on
the assumption that production activities in the manufacturing and minerals sectors
require more machinery imports than agricultural production, and that transportation of
machinery imports is more expensive for countries which are located further away from
major ports. Following Wood and Mayer (forthcoming), we can expect that countries
with a comparatively small natural-resource endowment (proxied by a country’s total
land area per worker) and a comparatively high educational attainment (proxied by the
years of schooling per worker) have a comparative advantage in manufacturing (and
hence require comparatively more machinery imports), and that a bigger size (proxied
by total population) of countries is associated with more manufacturing activities
because of economies of scale and external economies. A comparative advantage in the
minerals sector is proxied by the value of known mineral reserves per land area, while
the distance to the closest major port is used as a proxy for transportation costs
associated with machinery imports. While all of the correlation coefficients for this
group of variables have the expected sign, the correlation between the proxy for
transportation costs and machinery imports is very low.
A low level of machinery imports can be caused by high tariff or non-tariff barriers to
such imports (Panel C). A move towards greater trade openness is likely to be
accompanied by tariff reform but this does not necessarily imply a decline in the tariffs
on intermediate and capital goods because (i) budgetary revenues in developing
countries often strongly depend on tariffs, and tariffs on machinery imports are pure
revenue tariffs because these goods cannot be sourced domestically, and (ii) tariff
reform has often aimed primarily at reducing tariff dispersion rather than the level of
specifically targeted tariffs. This may explain the relatively low correlation coefficients
in this panel.
The variables in panel D reflect the financing capacity of countries to pay for imports.
The surprising result in this panel is the positive correlation between the ratio of
external debt to GDP and the ratio of machinery imports to GDP. However, this may
reflect the fact that a number of countries are unable to meet their external debt-
servicing obligations and that they may prefer accumulating arrears which are unlikely
ever to be paid, rather than foregoing the potential for future growth by renouncing
machinery imports. Moreover, the analysis below suggests that this result which reflects
the association within the entire sample is in fact driven by a few countries.
The correlation between some of the variables and machinery imports may be concealed
by the inclusion of countries whose GDP-ratio of machinery imports during the 1990s
was lower than during the 1970s. To investigate this possibility, the 40-country set was
divided into three sub-groups: ‘poor performers’ (Haiti, Somalia and Togo) whose
GDP-ratio of machinery imports strongly fell between the 1970s and the 1990s, ‘good
performers’ (Bangladesh, China, Ghana, Honduras, India, Nepal, Nigeria, Sri Lanka,
Uganda, and Zimbabwe) whose GDP-ratio of machinery imports more than doubled
proportionally or strongly rose in absolute terms, and the group of ‘average performers’
which includes the remaining 26 countries. The comparison between ‘good’ performers
on the one side and ‘bad’ or ‘average’ performers on the other show essentially the
same results. But since it could be argued that civil unrest had a sizable impact on the
results of the ‘poor performers’, it may be useful to focus on the comparison between14
the ‘good’ and the ‘average performers’, reported in columns 3, 4 and 6 of Table 3. All
of the associations are in the expected direction and significant, except for the
geography variable, the charges on machinery and equipment imports, and inward FDI.
Regarding the latter, the weak but still existing correlation is driven by the inclusion of
China and Nigeria—whose GDP-ratios of inward FDI are by far the highest within the
40-country sample—in the group of good performers. When these countries are
excluded, the P-value of the F-test reported in column 6 of Table 3 goes to 0.59,
excluding only China, and 0.72, excluding also Nigeria.10 This result is likely to be due
to the fact that flows of FDI to developing countries have often been concentrated in a
few middle-income countries plus China, so that the majority of low-income
countries—especially those which do not have a large minerals sector—have to rely on
other channels for technology transfer.
In summary, the statistical analysis of the causes of variation within the group of low-
income countries with regard to the absolute change in the GDP-ratio of machinery
imports between the 1970s and 1990s suggests positive and statistically significant
associations with a high GDP-ratio of domestic investment and a good investment
climate, a comparative advantage in manufacturing or in the minerals sector, and the
availability of foreign exchange, while there is no statistically significant association
with natural or policy-induced trade barriers and FDI-inflows.
In conclusion, the statistical analysis of the evolution of technology imports by low-
income countries suggests that the technological integration of these countries as a
group has increased, but that comparatively few individual countries account for this
phenomenon. The heterogeneity of the countries included in the sample makes it
difficult to find meaningful criteria which separate these countries from the others.
There is some evidence suggesting that economies with either a very small or a very
large size, and economies with a large minerals sector have made most advance in
technological integration but it is clear that there are wide discrepancies even among
these countries with regard to the barriers of technology adoption discussed in the
previous section. The importance of technology imports from technologically more
advanced developing countries remains small compared to such imports from developed
countries, but has substantially risen over the past two decades. Whereas general-
purpose technology has remained the most important part of technology imports from
developed countries, specialized technology imports play a substantial role in
technology imports from technologically more advanced developing countries. Whereas
the sectoral bias of technology imports has remained small, it has been strongest for
mineral-based activities; the importance of specialized technology imports related to
agricultural activities has fallen, while that related to low-skilled-labour-intensive
activities has substantially increased.
10 There is a statistically stronger correlation between the absolute change in FDI-inflows during the
1970s and the 1990s and the absolute change in machinery imports over this period but this evidence
is difficult to interpret because of the small number of countries for which complete data are available.15
3 Labour productivity and demand for skilled labour
The above has shown that the GDP-ratios of technology imports have risen in low-
income countries as a group pointing to an increase in total factor productivity in these
countries. But it is likely that developed countries have also introduced new
technologies over the past few years so that the question arises as to whether the higher
technology imports have actually reduced the productivity gap between developed and
low-income countries.
It is clear that a country’s productivity gap is influenced—in addition to technology
imports—by a large number of domestic factors including structural characteristics,
resource endowments and policies pursued. These factors vary from one country to
another, and a full account of such influences requires detailed country analysis that
goes beyond the scope of this paper. But as an approximation, it appears reasonable to
assume that the introduction of new technology in low-income countries implies a
reallocation of labour from low to high-productivity activities—both within and
between industrial sectors—which in general are both more capital and skill-intensive.
This means that increased technology imports are likely to be accompanied by an
increase in labour productivity—in the growth-accounting framework, increases in
labour productivity reflect a rising ratio of capital to labour and overall technical
progress—and in the demand for skilled labour.11
3.1 Labour productivity
Table 4 provides a simple assessment of the evolution of labour productivity in the
United States—the world’s technology leader—and various low-income countries for a
number of low, medium and high-skill industries. Given the lack of data, the evidence
needs to be interpreted cautiously. Nonetheless, the table suggests that only some of the
14 countries for which data are available have experienced rising labour productivity
over the past few years. India appears to be the only one of the 14 countries which has
succeeded in reducing the gap in labour productivity with respect to the United States
across all industrial sectors. Pakistan, Sri Lanka and Zimbabwe have also been
relatively successful in keeping up with productivity increases in the United States. It is
also noteworthy that India achieved the highest increase in labour productivity in
labour-intensive sectors (where India raised its specialized technology imports most)
and minerals and metal-related sectors (where India’s specialized technology imports
have traditionally been highest, see Mayer (2000 table 5)). Whereas the evidence for the
other countries is less uniform, the table (in conjunction with table 5 in Mayer (2000))
suggests that Sri Lanka also managed to raise labour productivity in those sectors where
the country’s specialized technology imports were highest. This means that there is
some indication to suggest that those countries with high and/or rising specialized
technology imports have indeed succeeded in raising sector-specific labour productivity
faster than countries with low and/or falling specialized technology imports. But
generally speaking, low-income countries have not been very successful in keeping up
with productivity increases in the United States.
11 For a detailed discussion of technology-skill and capital-skill complementarities and their implications
for labour productivity and skill demand, see O’Connor and Lunati (1999).16
Table 4:
Labour productivity in selected low-income countries and industrial sectors, 1996 (index
numbers 1980=1)
Total Food Textiles Clothing Footwear Non-ferrous
Manufacturing products metals
(ISIC 300) (ISIC 311/12) (ISIC 321) (ISIC 322) (ISIC 324) (ISIC 372)
Bangladesh 0.8 1.0 0.6 1.0 1.3 n.a.
Cameroon 0.7 0.6 1.2 1.7 n.a. 1.0
Central African Republic 0.7 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
China 1.0 1.8 0.5 n.a. n.a. 1.0
Gambia 1.2 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Ghana 0.8 1.2 0.7 n.a. n.a. 0.5
India 2.6 5.1 1.9 3.1 1.7 3.2
Kenya 1.1 1.2 0.6 0.8 1.0 n.a.
Malawi 1.6 1.7 1.7 n.a. n.a. n.a.
Pakistan 1.5 1.0 2.5 1.3 1.6 0.8
Senegal 1.2 0.9 0.5 1.1 0.6 n.a.
Sri Lanka 1.4 2.6 2.3 1.7 1.8 2.5
Zambia 0.6 1.1 0.4 0.4 0.2 0.2
Zimbabwe 1.4 1.6 1.3 0.8 1.0 1.4
Memo item:
United States 1.4 1.3 1.2 1.3 1.1 0.8
Source: UNIDO Industrial Statistics Database and UNCTAD database.
Notes: Labour productivity calculated as real value added (in US dollar) per worker. Nominal value
added deflated by the GDP-deflator which was derived implicitly
by dividing the GDP series at current prices by constant price GDP series referenced to 1995.
All data for Ghana and Kenya for 1995, for Malawi and Zambia for 1994, for Central African
Republic and Gambia for 1993, and for Bangladesh and Pakistan for 1992.
Data for Sri Lanka are for 1993 except for non-ferrous metals and metals products for 1992.
These results can be taken to suggest that even though low-income countries have
increased their technology imports over the past few years, this increase has not been
sufficiently high to match technological progress in developed countries. But the results
can also be taken to support the hypothesis advanced by Acemoglu and Zilibotti (1999)
that productivity differences between developed and developing countries continue to
exist even with rapid diffusion of new technology. According to these authors, the
reason for this are differences in skill scarcities, i.e. developed countries design new
technologies for the factor combinations which prevail there so that developing
countries, which import such technologies and whose relative supply of skilled workers
is lower, must use unskilled workers in tasks performed by skilled workers in developed
countries. This constraint may be particularly stringent for those countries whose
absolute number of skilled workers falls short of some critical threshold. The two views
combined underscore the importance of a simultaneous increase in technology imports
and skill levels in low-income countries as emphasized in section 1.17
3.2 Wage differentials and the demand for labour
In addition to affecting cross-country productivity convergence, changes in the GDP-
ratio of technology imports are likely also to impact on the wage differential between
skilled and unskilled workers.12 This differential is likely to widen in the short run and
to provide incentives to individuals to enhance their investment in education—Bartel
and Lichtenberg (1987), for example, show that the process of adjustment to the
implementation of new technology uses educated labour—so that over long periods skill
supply and demand are likely to grow apace. To the extent that there is such a short-run
impact, relative wages follow a path similar to technology imports, while in the long run
this impact is conditioned by changes in the supply of skilled labour.13 A rising wage
differential provides greater incentives to individuals to afford the costs of investment in
education and thus supports the virtuous circle of technology and skill upgrading from
the supply side of skill accumulation. An individual’s incentive to forego current
income and invest in education depends on the wage differential between better and less
educated labour, and on the probability of finding employment that adequately rewards
the skills achieved.14 There is evidence of such a differential in low-income countries
and of its tendency to widen as education levels increase: the difference between the
wages of workers with secondary and primary education tends to exceed that between
workers with primary education and those with no schooling.15
The expectation of rising wage differentials is contrary to the view that globalization
will promote greater income equality as it will benefit the poor, unskilled workers. This
view relates to Heckscher-Ohlin trade theory according to which countries tend to
produce and export goods which use their most abundant domestic resources
intensively, and conversely import goods which require large inputs of resources that
12 Alternative understandings of the effects of factor-biased technical change in an open economy
determine diverging expectations on the impact of such change on relative wages between skilled and
unskilled labour. If technical change leads to an equal absolute change in the amount of labour used
per unit of output, relative wages between skilled and unskilled workers will not change. However,
this implies different relative changes in the amount of labour inputs across products. To the extent
that this is true, only sector-biased technical change which limits technical progress to the production
of a skill-intensive good changes the input of skilled labour and relative wages. Whether technical
change leads to equal absolute or equal relative changes in skilled-labour inputs is largely an empirical
questions and depends on the degree of substitutability of factor inputs, while how enduring this
effects is depends on the supply elasticity of skilled labour.
13 It can also be argued that globalization raises capital flows from developed to developing countries.
This means that – even without technology imports – capital-output ratios in developing countries
would rise and given the complementarity between capital and skill, this would raise the relative
demand for skilled labour.
14 A vast empirical literature suggests that education is indeed a major determinant of an individual’s
earnings, that returns to education respond to this supply, and that educational choice is in large part
an investment decision. But to the extent that parents finance their children’s education, family
income and wealth has an additional impact on the valuation of education, as well as on the interaction
between demography and education.
15 This evidence goes against the conventional wisdom that rates of return on education are highest for
primary education, followed by secondary and tertiary education, as argued in many papers by
Psacharopoulos (e.g. Psacharopoulos, 1994). But Bennell (1996, 1998) argues that this pattern does
not prevail in sub-Saharan Africa and South Asia (i.e. the geographic location of most low-income
countries) because of lacking wage employment opportunities (see also World Bank, 1995, p. 39).18
are locally scarce. Recognizing the importance of relative endowments of skilled and
unskilled labour, under free trade production in countries with abundant unskilled
labour (such as the large low-income countries) should concentrate on agricultural and
manufacturing goods that require unskilled labour. According to a simple variant of the
theory, this is likely to lead to an increase in the demand for unskilled labour and hence
a reduction in wage inequality.
However, even if trade integration causes resources to shift towards unskilled-labour-
intensive sectors, the degree of skill intensity will tend to increase within each sector if
integration is accompanied by increased (mainly general-purpose) technology imports.
If these technology effects are sufficiently strong, the returns to skilled labour will rise
not fall.
Unfortunately, available country-specific evidence on the evolution of wage
differentials in developing countries is limited to high and middle-income countries. But
it is noteworthy that this evidence points to a rapid improvement of the labour incomes
of skilled manpower and the reduction or lack of growth in pay levels for workers not
taking part in the modernization of production. Many Latin American countries share
this experience as shown, for example, by Robbins and Gindling (1999) for Costa Rica.
As an explanation, they point to the fact that trade integration was accompanied by an
acceleration in the introduction of best-practice technology which requires skilled
labour.16 It can also be argued that in countries with surplus labour, employment of
unskilled labour can increase without leading to rising real wages, and since unskilled-
labour intensive activities also employ some skilled labour, this could lead to higher
wages for skilled labour.
Tables 2 and 4 above suggest that not all low-income countries have achieved rising
technology imports and that in some low-income countries there has been no increase in
labour productivity. This is likely to imply that in many low-income countries
globalization has not been associated with an increased demand for skills.17 Rather, it
appears to have been associated with a decline in an individual’s returns to skill. Even
though this could be welcomed in countries with high initial income inequality, it can
also be interpreted as a reduction in the incentive to invest in education. To the extent
that lower investment in education today implies reduced future per capita income
levels and perhaps slower long-run growth, governments would need to make special
efforts to raise technology imports and simultaneously bolster individual educational
incentives.
4 Concluding remarks
An important determinant of the benefits which low-income countries can reap from
globalization is whether they can ignite a simultaneous increase of technology imports
and the skill level of the domestic labour force. This implies a need for government
16 But see Wood (1997) for a different explanation.
17 Berman and Machin (2000) also find that there has been no increase in the demand for skilled labour
in low-income countries (their group of low-income countries includes only seven countries in spite of
a much broader definition of ‘low income’ than the one used in this paper).19
policy to sustain incentives for human capital formation and for a reduction in the cost
of technology adoption. The coordination of such efforts is crucial because investment
in human capital alone will lead to diminishing returns of skill accumulation, while
increased technology transfer alone is unlikely to be enduring and might have negative
developmental effects from rising income inequality.
This is also one of the lessons from the East Asian development experience where rapid
industrialization and skill accumulation were achieved by expansion of the education
system in conjunction with a step-by-step upgrading of the skill intensity of economic
activities. Doing so not only reduced the technology gap with advanced countries and
raised the demand for educated labour, but also provided the training and experience
needed to realize the economic potential of educated workers. The difference is that in
low-income countries this upward spiral does not necessarily need to occur in skill-
intensive manufacturing activities but—depending on the specific sectors in which a
country has a competitive edge—might need to be based in primary sectors, unskilled-
labour-intensive manufacturing, or services where this diversity reflects the
heterogeneity within the group of low-income countries.
To the extent that these efforts imply increased budgetary spending, low-income
countries are at a disadvantage because the problem of mobilizing additional
government revenue is likely to be most acute in the poorest countries and especially
difficult without external sources of finance.
References
Acemoglu, D. and F. Zilibotti (1999). ‘Productivity differences’, Working Paper No.
6879, National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER), Cambridge (Mass.) January.
Bartel, A. and F. Lichtenberg (1987). ‘The comparative advantage of educated workers
in implementing new technology’. The Review of Economics and Statistics,V o l .
LXIX (1), pp. 1–11.
Bennell, P. (1996). ‘Rates of return to education: does the conventional pattern prevail
in sub-Saharan Africa?’. World Development, Vol. 24 (1), pp. 183–199.
Bennell, P. (1998). ‘Rates of return to education in Asia: a review of the evidence’.
Education Economics, Vol. 6 (2), pp. 107–120.
Berman, E. and S. Machin (2000). ‘Skill-biased technology transfer: evidence of factor
biased technological change in developing countries’. Boston University: Mimeo.
(http://econ.bu.edu/eli).
Bresnahan, T. and M Trajtenberg (1995). ‘General purpose technologies: “engines of
growth”?’. Journal of Econometrics, Vol. 65 (1), pp. 83–108.
Coe, D.T. and E. Helpman (1995). ‘International R&D spillovers’. European Economic
Review, Vol. 39, pp. 859–887.
Coe, D.T., E. Helpman and A.W. Hoffmaister (1997). ‘North-South R&D spillovers’.
The Economic Journal, Vol. 107 (1), pp. 134–149.20
Coe, D.T. and A.W. Hoffmaister (1999). ‘Are there international R&D spillovers
among randomly matched trade partners? A response to Keller’. Working Paper No.
99/18, International Monetary Fund. February.
Eaton, J. and S. Kortum (1999). ‘International technology diffusion: theory and
measurement’. International Economic Review, Vol. 40, pp. 537–570
Keller, W. (1998). ‘Are international R&D spillovers trade-related? Analyzing
spillovers among randomly matched trade partners’. European Economic Review,
Vol. 42 (September), pp. 1469–1491
Lucas, R. (1993). ‘Making a miracle’. Econometrica, Vol. 61, pp. 251–272
Mayer, J. (2000). ‘Globalization, technology transfer, and skill accumulation in low-
income countries’. Discussion Paper No. 150, UNCTAD, Geneva. August
Nelson, R. and E. Phelps (1966). ‘Investment in humans, technological diffusion, and
economic growth’. American Economic Review, Vol. 56 (May), pp. 69–75.
O’Connor, D. and M. Lunati (1999). ‘Economic opening and the demand for skills in
developing countries: a review of theory and evidence’. Technical Paper No. 149
(OECD Development Centre: Paris). June
OECD (1992). Industrial Policy in OECD Countries. Annual Review. Paris:OECD.
Parente, L.P. and E.C. Prescott (1994). ‘Barriers to technology adoption and
development’. Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 102 (2), pp. 298–321
Psacharopoulos, G. (1994). ‘Returns to education: a global update’.W o r l d
Development, Vol. 22 (9), pp. 1325–1343.
Robbins, D. and T.H. Gindling (1999). ‘Trade liberalization and the relative wages for
more-skilled workers in Costa Rica’. Review of Development Economics,V o l .3( 2 ) ,
pp. 140–154.
UNCTAD (2000). Handbook of Statistics 2000. New York and Geneva: United Nations
Wood, A. (1997). ‘Openness and wage inequality in developing countries: the Latin
American challenge to East Asian conventional wisdom’. The World Bank Economic
Review, Vol. 11 (1), pp. 33–57.
Wood, A. and J. Mayer, forthcoming, ‘Africa’s export structure in a comparative
perspective’. Cambridge Journal of Economics.
World Bank (1995). World Development Report. Oxford and New York: Oxford
University Press.
Young, A. (1993). ‘Invention and bounded learning by doing’. Journal of Political
Economy, Vol. 101, pp. 443–472.UNU World Institute for Development Economics Research (UNU/WIDER)
was established by the United Nations University as its first research and
training centre and started work in Helsinki, Finland in 1985. The purpose of
the Institute is to undertake applied research and policy analysis on structural
changes affecting the developing and transitional economies, to provide a
forum for the advocacy of policies leading to robust, equitable and
environmentally sustainable growth, and to promote capacity strengthening
and training in the field of economic and social policy making. Its work is
carried out by staff researchers and visiting scholars in Helsinki and through
networks of collaborating scholars and institutions around the world.
UNU World Institute for Development Economics Research (UNU/WIDER)
Katajanokanlaituri 6 B, 00160 Helsinki, Finland
Camera-ready typescript prepared by Anna Kervinen at UNU/WIDER
Printed at UNU/WIDER, Helsinki
The views expressed in this publication are those of the author(s). Publication does not imply
endorsement by the Institute or the United Nations University, nor by the programme/project sponsors, of
any of the views expressed.
ISSN 1609-5774
ISBN 952-455-202-7 (printed publication)
ISBN 952-455-203-5 (internet publication)